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ABSTRACT 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 aims at 
creating the legal, political, and business conditions for a freer circulation of 
goods, capitals and services in North America. However it gives scant 
attention to the mobility of workers.  
The basic premise of this paper is that globalisation of trade and the 
universal diffusion of human rights have evolved and progressed side by side, 
even though with difficulty and reluctantly, and that the regional liberalisation 
of trade must be deeply interwoven with issues related to socio-economic 
rights to be ultimately and durably successful.   
This paper’s major questions are: How does NAFTA address labour 
mobility? Does NAFTA neglect, oppose or support the free movement of 
people across its borders? Does the agreement deal with labour mobility in a 
clear and definite manner or does it ignore it and give it short shrift? Should 
NAFTA support the liberalisation of immigration within its area as a long 
term objective, as part of a deeper and broader regional integration, 
conditioned on considerable reforms by its Member States, especially 
Mexico’s legal system, and energy, tax and banking policies, among others?  
Is the free movement of people needed to be truly successful and provide 
economic security, survival and prosperity for its member countries in view of 
vastly changed economic and trade conditions since its inception? 
This paper first traces the history of the drafting of NAFTA. Then it 
examines what NAFTA means for labour mobility within the complex 
interaction between an economic colossus like the United States and a 
developing country like Mexico, also taking into account current migration 
trends. In this section, the paper also covers the liberalisation of the mobility 
of labour (albeit limited) brought about through administrative regulations. 
Interspersed with this there is a discussion of what should be a mutually 
reinforcing relationship between international free trade and social policy. 
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Then the paper addresses the links and the relationship between trade, labour 
standards and migration. Comparative perspectives with the approach of the 
European Union to movement of workers are also included. Finally, there is a 
brief critique evaluating NAFTA’s legal processes against the ideal to 
reconcile social integration with regional free trade.  Economic realities and 
crises and the surge in economic and trade power of China, India and possibly 
Brazil that are redefining the pre-eminence and dominance of the United 
States are also factored in when the argument for liberalisation of the 
movement of people within NAFTA is made.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When Canada, Mexico and the United States completed the negotiations 
for the North America Free Trade Agreement1 (NAFTA), Gene McNary, the 
then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner, stated that: 
 
“[I] feel more than a bit confident in acknowledging that, if 
immigration is not formally on the table, someone of the table will 
sooner or later realise as a practical matter that moving goods and 
services in international commerce also involves moving the people 
who trade in those goods and services.”2 
 
                                                     
1 The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec 17, 1992, US-Can-Mex, 32 I L M 
289 (Parts 1-3) and 32 I L M 612 (Parts 4-8) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement is a free trade agreement between Canada, the 
United States of America and Mexico. It was initially pursued by free-trade 
conservative governments in the United States and Canada, led by Canadian Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, and US President George H W Bush. There was 
considerable opposition on both sides of the border. In the United States President 
Clinton made its passage a major legislative initiative and was able to secure passage 
in 1993. Vice President Al Gore attempted to build support for the bill by debating the 
issue with H Ross Perot on the Larry King Live talk show. Perot was an outspoken 
critic of NAFTA during his 1992 presidential campaign, claiming that passage would 
cause a “giant sucking sound” of jobs leaving the United States for Mexico. After 
intense political debate, and the negotiation of several side agreements, the US House 
passed NAFTA by 234-200 (132 Republicans and 102 Democrats voting in favour) 
and the US Senate passed it by 61-38. Some opposition persists to the present day. 
NAFTA was signed on December 17, 1992 and went into effect on January 1, 1994.  
2 See Noemi Gal-Or “Labour Mobility Under NAFTA: Regulatory Policy 
Spearheading the Social Supplement to the International Trade Regime” (1998) 15 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 365. See also Gene McNary 
“Making Goods and People in International Commerce: Remarks of the Hon Gene 
McNary” (1992) 2 Duke Journal of Comparative and International 247.  
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When considered by itself, the above statement may simply express the 
frustration of the (then) INS3 seeing immigration issues marginalised during 
the setting up of the first major trade agreement in North America. However, 
when it is considered in the context of the discussions at that time, during 
which organised labour, environmental and other non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) and interest groups were voicing their concern, 
disagreements and disappointment, it represents a substantial issue in its own 
right. Actually, labour unions were not fighting for the right of freedom of 
movement for people, that is for labour mobility across the NAFTA territory 
as a right for each worker, but, on the contrary, were concerned about the 
migration of factories and other business away from American workers. In 
particular they were worried about the flight of business away from low 
skilled and lower socioeconomic level labour in the United States and Canada 
towards Mexicans. They were very concerned that Mexican immigrants in the 
US would take away jobs currently being filled by American workers and 
drive down wage rates in those sectors where Mexican workers were 
competing for jobs in the US.4 This is still the root of the unions’ opposition 
to allowing Mexican lorries with Mexican drivers to carry cargo to and from 
the US. Additional areas of contention were the protection and harmonisation 
of labour rules and the concern that they may be downgraded as the outcome 
of joining two developed economies with a developing one. 
Historically, there has been considerable resistance in the United States to 
recognising socio-economic rights. Almost exclusive preference has been 
given to civil and political rights. This is evidenced by the fact that the United 
States has ratified the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but not that 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.5 In addition the two march in 
unison: while the labour standards do not per se affect labour mobility, labour 
mobility includes issues related to labour standards. An example is providing 
the same protections to non-nationals as to nationals.  
Even its proponents thought of NAFTA not as a customs union or a single 
market but only as a free trade area similar to its predecessor, the Canada-
                                                     
3 Now part of the US Department of Homeland Security, and called the US Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP). 
4 Patricia Fernandez-Kelly “NAFTA and Beyond: Alternative Perspectives in the 
Study of Global Trade and Development” (2007) The Annals of the American 
Academy of Social and Political Sciences 610.  
5 Both Covenants were adopted by the UN General Assembly, Resolution 2200, 
December 16, 1966. The ICCPR came into force on March 24, 1976. The US Senate 
gave its “advice and consent” for ratification in June 1992 but with numerous and 
substantial reservations and exceptions. The ICESC came into force on January 3, 
1976. The US has not ratified it. 
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United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA).6 NAFTA did not include any 
plans for political and social integration. For this reason many analysts 
maintain that NAFTA was not conceived with the goal of establishing a 
system that allowed the freedom of movement of persons between the three 
member states. Rather it was thought of as expressly facilitating only the 
movement of goods, capital and services. People and their freedom of 
movement are noticeably excluded.7 Chapter 16 is designed to facilitate 
temporary visitors for business, but certainly not the workers’ movement. The 
fact that immigration issues were not discussed or considered at that time 
demonstrates the high awareness and sensitivity felt around this issue.8 It is 
specifically because of the high volatility of immigration issues in the 
relations between the United States and Mexico9 that the Parties to the treaty 
decided to avoid it for fear of endangering agreement on the “directly related 
(real) trade issues” being negotiated at that time.10 Efforts to address labour 
mobility would certainly have led to the rejection of NAFTA in the Congress 
                                                     
6 (1988) 27 International Legal Materials 29 [KJ5 I574]. Public Law 100-449 (Act of 
9/28/88); see also United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act 
of 1988 (Public Law 100 - 449, 102 Stat 1851); Executive Order 12662, 
Implementing the United States-Canada Free-Trade Implementation Act, December 
31, 1988. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was a trade agreement reached by 
Canada and the United States in October 1987. The agreement removed several trade 
restrictions in stages over a ten year period, and resulted in a great increase in cross-
border trade. On January 1, 1994, it was superseded by the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, which included Mexico as well.   
7 See Elizabeth Kraus “The Systemic Effects of Economic Trade Zones on Labour 
Migration: The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Lessons of the 
European Community” (1993) 7 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 323. See also 
Kevin Johnson “Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA & Mexican Immigration in 
the United States” (1994) 27 UC Davis Law Review 937.  
8 See Beverly Baker-Kelly “United States Immigration: A Wake-Up Call!” (1994) 37 
Howard Law Journal 283. See also Bradly J Condon and J Brad McBride “Do You 
Know the Way to San José? Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to 
the United States” (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 251.  
9 See Luis Herrera-Lasso “The Impact of US Immigration Policy on US-Mexico 
Relations” (1998) 3 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 357.  
10 For a discussion of how and why US-Mexico immigration and trade policies have 
developed independently, see Gabriela A Gallegos “Borders Matter: Redefining the 
National Interests in US-Mexico Immigration and Trade Policy” (2004) 92 California 
Law Review 1729. Gallegos argues that “the separation of trade and immigration 
likely stems not simply from economic rationales, but from an understanding of the 
national interest grounded in nativistic racism…” at 1729. See also D Massey, J 
Durand and N J Malone Labor Economics: Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican 
Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
2002). 
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and Senate.11  Migration issues were as politically sensitive in the early 1990s 
as they are today but the number of Mexican workers in the US then (legally 
and illegally) was far lower than it is today. 
Even though immigration between Canada and Mexico has been limited12 
and between Canada and the United States not problematic, the Canadians 
were concerned about this matter as well.13  Historically, both Canada and the 
United States have linked the importation of labour with granting citizenship. 
Even though Canada grants temporary working permits and gives those who 
qualify a working visitor status, this is not the norm. Likewise, the United 
States, with the considerable exception of Mexican migrant farm workers, 
until at least the 9/11 events preferred permanent residence and now 
naturalization to issuing working permits.14 Because of increased deportations 
post 9/11 for various reasons, especially for a past criminal record, regardless 
of how slight and ancient the crime, many immigrants have decided to apply 
for citizenship as an added protection against possible deportation 
proceedings.15 President Bush’s 2004 proposal to create, expand and 
formalize a guest worker program16 was rejected by the Republican 
                                                     
11 Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and Douglas S Massey “Borders for Whom? The Role of 
NAFTA in Mexico-US Migration” (2007) 610 Annals 98.  
12 See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 366. For a comprehensive discussion of Canada-Mexico 
relations on issues of immigration and NAFTA, see D Goldfarb The Canada-Mexico 
Conundrum: Finding Common Ground (Toronto: Howe Institute, 2005). 
13 The number of legal, temporary workers in Canada from Mexico rose 68 percent, to 
22,344 from 13,261, from 1998 to 2003. By comparison, there were 110,075 legal, 
temporary workers admitted to the United States from Mexico in 1998, and 130, 327 
in 2003, an 18 percent rise. The number of Mexicans legally resident in Canada is 
only about 50,000 while in the millions in the United States.  
14 See Shannon Leigh Vivian “Be Our Guest: A Review of the Legal and Regulatory 
History of US Immigration Policy Toward Mexico and Recommendations for 
Combating Employer Exploitation of Non-Immigrant and Undocumented Workers” 
(2005) 30 Seton Hall Legislative Journal 188. 
15 For example, in FY 2004, 537,151 people gained US citizenship, yet a processing 
backlog of 653,190 naturalization applications remained. The number of 
naturalizations was a 16 percent increase from the 463,204 naturalized in FY 2003. 
The higher naturalization numbers were consistent with the higher number of 
applications received during FY 2004. The processing backlog grew 4 percent 
(25,920) between FY 2003 and FY 2004.  See: 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/FS12_immigration_US_2005.pdf 
16 See Ryan D Frei “Reforming US Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin American 
Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable” (2005) 39 
University of Richmond Law Review 1355 (2005). See also Pia Orrenius and Madeline 
Zavodny “Immigration Policy: What are the Consequences of an Amnesty for 
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dominated Congress that instead adopted legislation meant to stop Mexican 
illegal immigration through the construction of a wall, sensors and other 
security measures along the US-Mexican border.17  
However, as this paper will attempt to illustrate, the Canada-US Free 
Trade Agreement of 1989 (CUSFTA) and subsequently NAFTA, have 
brought forth modest changes in the prevailing norm of exclusion by 
introducing and identifying those in the service sector crossing NAFTA 
boundaries as in a “guest worker” category. These visas to the US, however, 
are quite difficult to obtain.  
The basic premise of this paper is that globalisation of trade and the 
universal diffusion of human rights have evolved and progressed side by side, 
even though with difficulty and reluctantly, and that the regional liberalisation 
of trade should be deeply interwoven with issues related to socio-economic 
rights.18 Generally, the justification and the objectives of a regional trade 
agreement are the development and strengthening of trade relations among the 
parties and, at least for the US, encouraging economic development and 
respect for the rule of law. This normally involves and affects political 
systems where labour management issues constitute an integral part of the 
socio-economic fabric. In this case any separation of these different 
components can be only temporary and forced. Of course, “temporary” can be 
a very long time, especially when one is discussing immigration. Outside the 
European Union, there are almost no FTAs that provide for any significant 
degree of labour mobility. The movement of persons, except for professionals, 
has not been successfully addressed not even in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS). 
Thus, this paper’s basic questions are: How does NAFTA address labour 
mobility? Does NAFTA neglect, oppose or support the free movement of 
people across its borders? Does the agreement deal with labour mobility in a 
clear and definite manner or does it ignore it and give it short shrift? Should 
the free movement of people be a long term objective of NAFTA, as part of a 
deeper and broader regional integration, conditioned on considerable reforms 
                                                                                                                              
Undocumented Immigrants?” (2004) 9 Georgetown Public Policy Review 21. See also 
above n 9.  
17 HR 6061 Secure Fence Act 2006, 109th Congress, 2nd Session.  See Justin C Glon, 
“Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: National Security and Terrorism – Time to 
Fence In Our Southern Border” (2005) 13 Indiana International and Comparative 
Law Review 349; Michael J Mayerle “Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An 
Unsatisfactory Answer to a Difficult, it not Impossible Question” (2002) 6 Journal of 
Small & Emerging Business Law 559.  
18 See Zoe Lofgren “Globalization, Security & Human Rights: Immigration in the 
21st Century: A Decade of Radical Change in Immigration Law” (2005) 6 Stanford 
Law & Policy Review 349. 
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by its Member States, especially Mexico’s legal system, and its energy, tax 
and banking policies among others? If one looks only at NAFTA’s direct 
effects on the liberalisation of the movement of people, then the answer is 
quick and short:  none at all. However, this paper will also address the indirect 
effects where there is a good deal to discuss. 
It is this paper’s position that NAFTA was conceived as a strategic 
superstructure that provided a detailed treatment in the areas of trade in goods, 
trade in services, investment, intellectual property and dispute settlements, 
among others. Some of the main actors, like former Mexican president 
Vicente Fox, saw the agreement six years after its entry into force as a basis 
for a wider and deeper integration, involving workers’ movement as well as 
other issues. However, Fox found little sympathy and support for his 
objectives from Canada and the US. The NAFTA process functions at 
different levels, reflecting the major players in it. There are the federal 
governments of the three countries that negotiated and signed the treaty and 
agreed upon the general framework of the agreement; and then, their 
constituent units, the States in the United States19 and Mexico and the 
provinces in Canada, charged with some of the implementation and 
application of the agreement. Most of the implementation is at the federal 
level, although in some areas (for example, investment and services) the states 
or provinces play a major role. Among the states, those at the frontier with 
Mexico play an even more significant role in migration issues. However, there 
is little formal coverage of such issues in NAFTA as already noted earlier. 
State and provinces also act as liaison between the federal and the local levels; 
and the bodies regulating labour reflect their own interpretation of NAFTA 
and thus play a major role in the continuous interpreting and drafting process 
that may additionally open up the regime to the free movement of people.20  
                                                     
19 There is considerable tension between States and the United States on the issue of 
who should be paying for the costs of illegal immigration (eg public benefits, 
education, medical care, law enforcement and incarceration). Data show that Florida, 
California, New Jersey, New York, Illinois and Texas have felt a negative economic 
impact because of illegal immigration. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari to 
Florida’s claim for federal reimbursement. See ARE THESE CASES? PLEASE 
CLARIFYChiles, 874 F Supp 1334, 1342 (SD Fla 1994); Chiles, 69 F 3d. 1094, 1097 
(11th Cir 1995); Padavan, 82 F 3d 23, 28-29 (2nd Cir 1996); New Jersey, 91 F. 3d 463-
467 (3rd Cir 1996). Many States argued 10th Amendment violations (“a 
commandeering of state legislative processes”) based on New York v US, 505 US 144, 
161 (1992). See also Stephen H Legomsky, “Immigration, Federalism, and the 
Welfare State” (1995) 42 UCLA Law Review 1453; Richard Sybert “Population, 
Immigration and Growth in California” (1994) 31 San Diego Law Review 945. See 
Gal-Or, above n 3, at 368. 
20 James F Hollifield and Thomas Chang “Trade and Migration in North America: 
The Role of NAFTA” (2005) 11 Law & Business Review 327, at 336. 
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Mobility is a highly complex area that ranges from laws regulating 
immigration to recognition of university and training credentials to the right to 
practice one’s profession in a different country.21 Consequently labour unions 
and professional organizations play a major role in facilitating and promoting 
the free circulation of persons. Introducing and strengthening regional and 
international free trade interwoven with the corresponding and commensurate 
social policy is indeed a complex process.22  
This paper first traces the history of the drafting of NAFTA. Then it 
examines what NAFTA means related to labour mobility within the complex 
interaction between an economic colossus like the United States and a 
developing country like Mexico, also taking into account current migration 
trends. In this section, the paper also covers the liberalisation of the mobility 
of labour (albeit limited) brought about through administrative regulations. 
Interspersed with this there is a discussion of what should be a mutually 
reinforcing relationship between international free trade and social policy. 
Then the paper addresses the links and the relationship between trade, labour 
standards and migration. Comparative perspectives with the approach of the 
European Union to movement of workers are also addressed. Finally, there is 
a brief critique evaluating NAFTA’s legal processes against the ideal to 
reconcile social integration with regional free trade.  Economic realities and 
crises and the surge in economic and trade power of China, India, possibly 
Brazil that are redefining the pre-eminence and dominance to date of the 
United States are also factored in, when the argument for liberalisation of the 
movement of people within NAFTA is made. 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
Within the framework of the continuous worldwide process of building 
trade blocks, the United States, Canada and Mexico came to realise in the late 
1980s-early 1990s how important it is to enter into regional agreements that 
reflect the interests and the aspirations of the contracting parties. The main 
impetus for the creation of NAFTA came from Canada. After the Second 
World War, Canada actually preferred the multilateral atmosphere because of 
the need to assert and protect Canada’s sovereignty opposite its powerful 
southern neighbour, the United States. However, growing globalisation, the 
new trade realities introduced by the World Trade Organization, and the 
changing economic climate pressured Canada to review its relationship with 
its most important trading partners and to restructure them accordingly by 
                                                     
21 Kevin R Johnson “Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican 
Immigration in the United States” (1994) 27 UC Davis Law Review 937, at 944. 
22 See Philip Martin “NAFTA and Mexico-US Migration: Policy Options” (2004) 11 
Law and Business Review of the Americas 361, at 372. 
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preferring bilateral agreements.23 It is worth pointing out that the US had 
changed its own policy of favouring only trade liberalisation in Geneva in the 
mid 1980s, when it negotiated an FTA with Israel.  There was also a partial 
precedent in the 1965 bilateral agreement on autos and auto parts between 
Canada and the United States, covering a sector that still accounts for a huge 
percentage of total North American trade in industrial goods.24 
   It was Canada that initially proposed the Free Trade Agreement25 with 
the United States and paved the way to it. The FTA was a very controversial 
issue in Canada, with many fearing economic, cultural and political 
domination by the United States. It attracted almost no attention in the United 
States. In formulating the agreement, the Canadians did favour the sectoral 
free trade approach to trade liberalisation.26  Even though this at the end was 
politically rejected, remnants of the sectoral approach continue to be 
embedded in the subsequent treaty, NAFTA. A good example is the labour 
market where a clear and sharp distinction is drawn between high skilled and 
low skilled labour.27 This in turn impacts the freedom of movement across the 
NAFTA. For example, Chapter 14 on Trade and Services of the CUSFTA28 
began a trend of also covering services in trade agreements.29 Admittedly it 
                                                     
23 See B W Wilkinson “NAFTA in The World Economy: Lessons and Issues for Latin 
America” in R G Lipsey and P Meller (eds) Western Hemisphere Trade Integration: 
A Canadian-Latin American Dialogue (London: Macmillan Press, 1997). 
24 In 1964, only seven percent of vehicles made in Canada were sent south of the 
border, but by 1968, thanks to the Automotive Products Trade Agreement, commonly 
known as the Auto Pact or APTA, an important trade agreement between Canada and 
the United States signed by Prime Minister Lester B Pearson and President Lyndon B 
Johnson in January 1965, this was sixty percent. By the same date, 1968, forty percent 
of cars purchased in Canada were made in the United States. Automobile and parts 
production quickly surpassed pulp and paper to become Canada's most important 
industry. Canada’s trade deficit was reversed into a trade surplus worth billions of 
dollars annually to Canada. The APTA was eventually declared illegal by the World 
Trade Organisation in 2001 but at that time it had already been superseded by 
NAFTA. 
25 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA or CUSFTA) (1988) 27 International 
Legal Materials 293 [KJ5 I574]. 
26 See Maureen Appeal Molot “The North American Free Trade Agreement: Policy or 
Investment-led?” in Richard G Lipsey and Patricio Meller, see above n 24.  
27 Karla M Campbell “Guest Worker Programs and the Convergence of US 
Immigration & Development Policies: A Two-Factor Economic Model” (2007) 21 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 663. 
28 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (1988) 27 International Legal 
Materials 281, at 368 [hereinafter FTA]. 
29 See James McIlroy “NAFTA Cross-border Provision of Services” (1996) 22 
Canada-United States Law Journal 203, at 204. 
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE FLOW OF TRADE VERSUS THE FLOW OF 
PEOPLE IN NAFTA 
 
96 
was a modest beginning: only three pages, plus annexes, relating to 
professions like architecture, tourism, computer services and 
telecommunications enhanced services. Anything not expressly included was 
excluded.30 
Thus, for example, health, education and social services were excluded. 
Afterwards, NAFTA expanded the list through the reworked provisions in 
Chapter 12 on Cross-Border Trade in Services.31  
Services are a labour intensive sector. For example, it is not possible to 
envision free trade in architecture without allowing an architect at a minimum 
to survey the construction site.32 For this reason the drafters of the CUSFTA 
introduced Chapter Fifteen allowing the temporary entry of business persons 
as a corollary to Chapter Fourteen already permitting controlled labour 
mobility across the FTA member states and furnishing the mechanisms to 
facilitate such movements.33 It is true, of course, that labour issues in the 
CUSFTA raise far fewer concerns. No one was or is particularly worried 
about a flow of workers from Canada into the US or vice versa. This policy 
was replicated in Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA (Temporary Entry for Business 
Persons).34 Soon after the implementation of the Canada-US FTA on January 
1, 1989, the US and Mexico began exploratory discussions on the possibility 
of entering into a free trade agreement.35 Canada quickly realised the potential 
impact of such an accord and the need to join it especially to make sure that 
Mexico would not end up with a more favourable agreement than Canada 
under the CUSFTA. Thus the negotiations for NAFTA were expanded to 
include Canada as well.  
President George Bush requested from Congress fast track negotiating 
authority to expedite concluding an agreement. Moving rapidly to negotiate 
and approve the Treaty was depicted as necessary to avoid failure in reaching 
an agreement. NAFTA opponents objected to the quick pace of the 
negotiations and limiting the role of Congress on the matter to only an “up or 
down” vote.  Limiting the debate and the input by Congress was seen by some 
                                                     
30 Ibid.  
31 See FTA, above n 26 at art 1501, 1502 S. 
32 See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 377. 
33 See Howard F Chang “Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare 
and the Optimal Immigration Policy” (1997) 145 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1147. 
34 See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 371. See also Nancy Fuller-Jacobs “Labour Mobility and 
the North American Free Trade Agreement” (1993) 1 San Diego Justice Journal 289, 
at 290. 
35 See G Hufbauer and J Schott North American Free Trade: Issues and 
Recommendations (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1992). 
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as undermining the democratic process.36 Labour and environmental 
organizations also opposed the fast track procedure37 as they perceived in 
NAFTA considerable threats to the environment and to labour standards.38  
President Bush eventually succeeded in obtaining fast track authority but only 
on the condition of establishing a parallel negotiation track to deal with 
environmental and labour issues.39 
Because of election campaign politics and the resonance among the 
American public of the criticism by environmental and labour groups, 
provisions favourable to the environment were moved from the parallel tract 
into NAFTA.40 Labour however did not achieve that level of success.41 While 
labour issues are mentioned in the list of NAFTA’s goals contained in its 
Preamble, the Agreement does not address labour issues until Chapter Eight 
and then only indirectly in the emergency sections provisions.42 The 
responsibility of addressing those issues fell on President Clinton. It was done 
with two supplemental “side agreements,” one on environment and one on 
labour.43 The considerable controversy about labour and the environment 
                                                     
36 See Alan C Nelson “NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must Be Addressed” (1994) 27 
UC Davis Law Review 987. 
37 See Robert Housman “The Treatment of Labour and Environmental Issues in 
Future Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalisation Efforts” (1994) 10 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 301, at 303. 
38 See Robert F Housman and Paul M Orbuch “Integrating Labour and Environmental 
Concerns into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look 
Ahead” (1993) 8 American Journal of International Law and Policy 719, at 724-25. 
39 Ibid, at 719. 
40  See Housman, above n 38, at 306-07. 
41 Elizabeth L Gunn “NOTE: Regionalizing Labour Policy Through NAFTA: Beyond 
President Bush’s Temporary Worker Proposal” (2005) 28 Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 353. 
42 See Kevin Johnson, above n 22, at 937. Johnson cites statements by the Bush 
administration to Congress:  “Until it came time for Congress to consider whether to 
ratify the trade agreement, the anomaly of NAFTA’s endorsement of free trade and 
closed borders went largely undiscussed, if not unnoticed…” at 941. See also 
Johnson’s analysis of why immigration was excluded from the agenda: “because (a) 
the Bush administration’s recognition of the political explosivity of the issue; (b) the 
closing of a vivid debate on immigration reform in the United States during the 
1980s; (c) the diametrically opposed interests of the United States and Mexico 
regarding immigration potentially capable to undermine a trade treaty; and (d) 
Mexico’s repressed concern about American human rights violations during border 
enforcement, and America’s fear that if discussed publicly it would lead to restrictions 
on their relevant policies.” See at 957-58. 
43 Unfortunately the two agreements did not harmonize the applicable laws across the 
NAFTA. See Housman, above n 38, at 306-07.  
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revealed that all three Treaty Parties had already on the books well crafted 
laws to address the concerns of those opposing NAFTA on labour and 
environmental issues.44 Consequently, most of the criticism zeroed in on the 
non-existent movement of people.    
The discussion in the United States relative to the ratification of NAFTA 
placed immigration front and centre as a key factor for both those supporting 
and opposing NAFTA.45 In the context of this debate, immigration from 
Canada into the United States at that time was not a problem. However, 
Mexican immigration into the United States was definitely a major concern.46 
Those opposing NAFTA were very concerned that NAFTA would 
dramatically increase Mexican legal and illegal immigration into the US47 
They lobbied for Congress to make ratification of NAFTA subject to a 
commitment on the part of Mexico to take aggressive steps to halt the flow of 
undocumented immigrants into the US.48 On the other side of the border, 
prominent Mexican thinkers and writers, like Jorge Castaneda, criticized 
                                                     
44 See Housman, above n 38, at 306-07. 
45 Ibid. 
46 For the US, immigration from Canada in the late 1980s-early 1990s posed no threat 
and raised no concern, given the socio-economic similarities between the two 
countries and the ethnic and cultural background in common. The portion of Canadian 
and Mexican immigration into the US has changed considerably in the last 150 years. 
Canadian immigrants were more numerous for some 100 years, from the 1850s to the 
1950s and peaked between 1921 and 1930 with a share of 22.5%, declining since 
then. Both Canadian and Mexican immigration increased especially in the first part of 
the 20th century as the US grew more xenophobic and laws were passed excluding 
Asians (Chinese Exclusion 1882) and Southern-Eastern Europeans (National Origins 
quota system 1924). Canadian and Mexican immigration was stimulated especially 
during the two World Wars and the Great Depression when European immigration to 
the US was cut off by adverse war and economic conditions and restrictive laws. 
Since 1980 the share of immigrants from Canada has been steady at 2.1%. Instead, the 
Mexican share, basically zero in the 19th century, has been growing exponentially 
especially since 1990 reaching about 25%. This refers only to legal immigration. If 
one adds the undocumented immigrants, the Mexican share has been estimated at over 
60%. Thus, the “NAFTA share” (Canadian plus Mexican legal immigrants)  reached a 
high of 35% in 1920-1930, then declined and has been close to 25-26% for the last 20 
years. See James F Hollifield and Thomas Osang “Trade and Migration in North 
America: The Role of NAFTA” (2005) 11 Law and Business Review of the Americas  
327, at 335-36. 
47 See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 373. For recent data and trends on immigration to the US, 
see Jeffrey Passel and Roberto Suro Rise, Peak and Decline: Trends in US 
Immigration 1992-2004 (Pew Hispanic Center, September 2005). 
48 See Melinda McGehee “Using Immigration as a Protectionist Mechanism while 
Promoting Free Trade” (2002) 8 Law and Business Review of the Americas 667. 
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NAFTA for not allowing for labour mobility;49 Castaneda wrote: “The 
governments are opening borders for goods and capital flows, while labour, 
Mexico’s main export, is barred from entry.”50 
 
III. NAFTA’S ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AND 
(LIMITED) IMMIGRATION OF WORKERS   
 
The NAFTA preamble states that the Parties have agreed to “protect, 
enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”51 However the right to seek work 
in another country was intentionally not included in the preamble,.52  While it 
would be a stretch to state that migration is a worker’s right, increasingly, lack 
of development and economic opportunity is seen as the root of many serious 
violations of human rights affecting entire classes like women, indigenous 
people and minorities. Among the human rights violations are lack of access 
to education, career opportunities, health services, and participation in civil 
and economic society.53 The NAFTA preamble also lists the Parties’ 
resolution to “create new employment opportunities, improve working 
conditions and living standards in their respective territories.”54 It is not 
evident if this applies to nationals of another Member Country.55 However, it 
is generally agreed that an unstated but significant objective of NAFTA is to 
create well paying jobs in Mexico so that Mexican workers, seeking work and 
to improve their lives, would not feel compelled any more to immigrate to the 
US undocumented.  To address the issue at some level, the Agreement 
                                                     
49 See Kevin R Johnson, above n 22. See also Thomas M Fullerton and Richard L 
Sprinkle “Border Controls, Public Policy, Immigration, and Trade with Mexico” 
(2004) 10 Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy 67. 
50 See Jorge G Castaneda and Carlos Heredia “Another NAFTA: What a Good 
Agreement Should Offer” (1992) 9 World Policy Journal 673. See also Kevin 
Johnson “Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A ‘Magic 
Mirror’ into the Heart of Darkness” (1998) 73 Indiana Law Journal 1111 and “An 
Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and US/Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two 
Treaties” (1998) 5 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 121. 
51 NAFTA, above n 1. 
52 Jayashri Srikantiah “Globalization, Security & Human Rights in the 21st Century” 
(2005) 16 Stanford Law and Policy Review 317. 
53 These rights are routinely denied to their citizens by the States who are parties to 
the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It is argued that States see 
these rights mostly as aspirational rather than “hard law”. This is also the reason given 
by the US to refuse ratifying this Covenant. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Teresa R Favilla-Solano “Legal Mechanisms for Enforcing Labour Rights 
Under NAFTA” (1996) 18 Hawaii Law Review 293.  
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includes the right to employment and labour mobility in a limited way in two 
chapters, Chapter 12 on Cross Border Trade in Services and Chapter 16 on 
Temporary Entry for Business Persons.56 Chapter 12 provides the framework 
for mobility and the obligations related to services, especially professional 
services.57 Chapter 16 specifies who is eligible to take advantage of this 
mobility and how, by specifying the eligible professional services and the 
authorities in charge of them.58  
Article 1213.2 defines professional services as “services, the provision of 
which requires specialized post-secondary education, or equivalent training or 
experience, and to which the right to practice is granted or restricted by a 
Party” but does not include services provided by trade persons or vessel and 
aircraft crew members. However, Chapter 12 unequivocally affirms that it 
does not create any immigration obligations for the Parties. In other words, it 
does not grant qualified citizens of the Parties the right to emigrate for 
employment. Article 1201.3 states: 
 
“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to: 
 
Impose any obligation on a Party with respect to a national of another 
Party seeking access to its employment market, or employed on a 
permanent basis in its territory, or to confer any right on that national 
with respect to such access or employment…”59 
 
Chapter 16 relates to Chapter 12 since it is the chapter that most clearly 
deals with immigration issues. Article 1608 on Definitions, for example, 
defines temporary entry as: 
 
“…entry into the territory of a Party by a business person of another 
Party without the intent   to establish permanent residence.”60  
 
Additionally,  
 
“Business person means a citizen of a Party who is engaged in the 
trade in goods, the provision of services or conduct of investment 
activities.”61 
                                                     
56 NAFTA, above n 1, at chs 12 and 16. 
57 See James McIlroy “NAFTA Cross-Border Provision of Services” (1996) 222 
Canada-United States Law Journal 203, at 204. 
58 See above n 57. The two chapters overlap somewhat. Chapter Sixteen cannot be 
implemented without compliance with chapter Twelve. 
59 NAFTA, above n 1, at art 1201.3. 
60 Ibid, at art 1608. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
101 
 
The Annexes to Chapter 16 contain only eight articles. Article 1603, 
Section D on Professionals refers to those individuals practicing one of the 
professions listed in Schedule II.62 The list is quite narrow. Also, professionals 
from other NAFTA countries cannot be self-employed in the United States.63 
The right of a Party to require a visa and to impose a quota is maintained.64 
This has the effect of significantly limiting the liberalisation of mobility 
between the Parties covered in Section D, Article 2. 65 The number of 
professionals allowed to enter the United States from Mexico has also been 
specifically limited to “5,500 initial petitions of business persons of Mexico 
seeking temporary entry under Section D of Article 1603.”66 While Canadians 
also need work permits to come into the US to work, there is no numerical 
limit for Canadians. Thus, Mexican professionals are treated less favourably 
than Canadians. 67 On the other hand, neither Canada nor Mexico has 
established quota limits on the entry of professionals from the other Parties. 
They do reserve the right to do so in the case of new members joining the 
NAFTA.68 
In conclusion, Chapter 16 neither permits immigration nor harmonizes the 
temporary entry conditions among the NAFTA Parties. Even when it comes to 
professionals listed on a restricted list, Chapter 16 does not allow for free and 
unrestricted temporary access. Among the three Parties, the United States 
provides the least favourable treatment. The Canadians have not obtained 
anything remarkably different under the NAFTA that they did not already 
have under the CUSFTA. The Mexicans continue to have the more limited 
                                                                                                                              
61 Ibid. 
62  Ibid, at annex 1603 S D art 1. 
63 See Gerald A Wunsch “Why NAFTA's Immigration Provisions Discriminate 
Against Mexican Nationals” (1994) 5 Indiana International and Comparative Law 
Review 127. 
64 See NAFTA, above n 1, at annex 1603 S D art 3.   
65 Ibid at annex 1603 S D arts 4-6.  See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 376. 
66 This limitation will expire ten years from the entry into force of the NAFTA, unless 
the Parties agree to remove it earlier. See ibid at sched III, art 3(b). 
67 See Ellen G Yost “NAFTA -- Temporary Entry Provisions -- Immigration 
Dimensions” (1996) 22 Canada-United States Law Journal 211, at 214. 
68 See Yost, above n 68, at 219-20. On the contrary, as the United States fortifies its 
border with Mexico, Canadian companies are reaching out to immigrants who are 
frustrated by US restrictions and tempted by dreams of a better life in Canada. The 
Canadian government has been relaxing its immigration rules in an effort to attract 
students and skilled workers from all over the world. That, and the push by companies 
promising jobs and visas, is attracting Mexican professionals turned off by the 
Minuteman Project, new border walls, tougher US entry requirements and laws like 
Proposition 200 in Arizona. 
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access to the United States than Canadians. While it is assumed that they are 
not that interested, US professionals also face limitations in their mobility to 
the other Parties.69 In other words, in contrast to the treaties among the 27 
Member States of the European Union,70 NAFTA does not envision as one of 
its priorities the free movement of people across the (basically eliminated) 
national borders of its Parties on an equal and non-discriminatory basis like 
the EU does.71 Similarly, it does not grant them, once they cross a border, the 
right of establishment enjoyed by citizens of the European Union within the 
European Union.72 
 
                                                     
69 See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 381.  For a summary of recent discussions on labour 
mobility, immigration and outsourcing, see Ryan Walters “Managing Global 
Mobility: Free Trade in Services in the Age of Terror” (2006) 6 UC Davis Law 
Review 92. 
70 The most important treaties establishing what is today the European Union are: the 
Treaty of Rome (1957; Consolidated version, OJ C340 10.11.1997) establishing the 
original European Economic Community; the Single European Act (OJ L 169 of 
29.06.1987); the Treaty on European Union or Maastricht Treaty (OJ C 191 of 
29.07.1992) that created a European Union and granted citizenship of the European 
Union to every national of a Member State; the Treaty of Amsterdam (OJ C 340 of 
10.11.1997); and the Treaty of  Nice (OJ C 80 of 10.03.2001). A European Union 
Constitution (OJ C310 of 16.12.2004) is in the process of being adopted by the 
Member States but the likelihood of this happening appears to be remote at this time.  
71 See Karen Engle and William Powers “Working Borders: Linking Debates about 
Insourcing and Outsourcing of Capital and Labour” (2005) 40 Texas International 
Law Journal 691. 
72 Article 39 of the EC Treaty provides for free movement of workers. Initially these 
rights were given only to “economically active” people (workers and people looking 
for work) and their families. Gradually, it has been recognized that the free movement 
of workers includes a social dimension. Regulation 1612/68 establishes that free 
movement is a fundamental right of workers. Worker’s rights include: the right to 
enter into any Member State, take up or search for employment; the right to reside; 
and the right to remain.  The Treaty of European Union (1993) establishes European 
citizenship (Art 17). Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, subject to certain limitations and conditions 
(Art 18). Freedom of establishment goes beyond the right to take up an activity as a 
self-employed person. The European Court of Justice has held that it extends to other 
elements connected to that right eg the right to rent premises, equal treatment as 
regards housing, and a right to access leisure facilities on a non-discriminatory basis. 
Article 43 of the EC Treaty therefore prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination 
on nationality grounds. An important feature of the rights available under Article 43 is 
the fact that Member States cannot disregard qualifications obtained in another 
Member State. 
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IV. LABOUR RELATED SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS 
 
Given the considerable limits to immigration even of professionals and the 
absence of any liberalisation for non-professionals, a side-agreement on 
labour, the North America Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC),73 
was negotiated and finalized one year after the NAFTA negotiations had been 
concluded. Along with the North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation (NAAEC),74 NAALC is basically a supplement to the NAFTA. It 
does not amend the Agreement. The NAALC does not provide for an 
integration of labour markets and does not set rules for migratory labour. It is 
an agreement between the Parties to the NAFTA to maintain and enforce their 
own national domestic labour laws. It limits itself to formulating a legal 
procedure and to establishing a Commission on Labour Cooperation. There is 
also an arbitration clause, however this is yet to be invoked.75 The mission of 
the Commission is to monitor the conditions of the NAFTA labour market; to 
foster compliance with the national laws and regulations of the respective 
Parties; and to manage dispute settlements procedures. 
In the United States, the NAALC76 was negotiated and proposed basically 
as a precondition to obtaining the ratification of the much debated NAFTA by 
                                                     
73 32 ILM 1499 (1993) The NAALC was created to address labour issues among the 
three countries. It entered into force on January 1, 1994. Like the environmental side 
agreement, it encourages trilateral cooperation, and, through its Commission for 
Labour Cooperation (CLC), helps enforce existing domestic labour laws. 
74 32 ILM 1480 (1993) The NAAEC is the environmental side agreement to the 
NAFTA. It came into force January 1, 1994. The Agreement creates a framework to 
better conserve, protect and enhance the North American environment through 
cooperation and effective enforcement of environmental laws.  
75 The Commission for Labour Cooperation is an international organisation created 
under the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC). The 
Commission is formed of a Council of Ministers, a cabinet-level body in charge of 
policy-setting and decision-making consisting of the three labour ministers or their 
representatives and a tri-national Secretariat that provides support to the Council and 
to the independent Evaluation Committees of Experts and Arbitral Panels the Council 
may establish under the provisions of the Agreement. The Commission works in close 
cooperation with the National Administrative Offices. 
76 Objectives of the NAALC: To improve working conditions and living standards in 
each Party's territory. To promote, to the maximum extent possible, the labour 
principles set out in the Agreement; to encourage cooperation to promote innovation 
and rising levels of productivity and quality; to encourage publication and exchange 
of information, data development and coordination, to carry out joint studies to 
enhance mutually beneficial understanding of the laws and institutions governing 
labour in each Party's territory; to pursue cooperative labour-related activities on the 
basis of mutual benefit, to promote compliance with, and effective enforcement by 
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE FLOW OF TRADE VERSUS THE FLOW OF 
PEOPLE IN NAFTA 
 
104 
Congress. It was meant to control undocumented immigration between the 
United States and Mexico77 and to limit the migration of jobs and investment 
away from any of the Parties to the benefit of another Party, in this case 
Mexico.78 It does not cover at all the topic of labour mobility or labour 
standards.  The provision for accession to the NAFTA itself79 does not include 
the NAALC since the NAALC was not concluded until about 9 months after 
NAFTA was signed and a year after completion of the NAFTA negotiations.80 
This reminds us clearly of how the Parties have relegated labour to a tertiary 
concern, after trade and the environment.81  
 
V.  TRADE, LABOUR STANDARDS AND MIGRATION: LINKS 
AND RELATIONSHIPS 
 
While one could argue that there is a strong link between the free 
movement of goods and services and the mobility of people involved in 
providing them,82 this inter-relationship has been overlooked, ignored or even 
rejected by those proposing free trade in North America.83 This is in line with 
most areas of the world using regional trade agreements, such as Mercosur 
and ASEAN, with the EU being a notable exception. On the other hand, the 
recognition of those links has been the hallmark of the European Union since 
                                                                                                                               
each Party of, its labour law; and  to foster transparency in the administration of 
labour law. Source: http://www.naalc.org/english/objective.shtml 
77 See Johnson, above n 22, at 960. 
78 See Housman, above n 38, at 318. 
79 See NAFTA, above n 1, at art 2204. See Gal-Or, above n 3, at 383. 
80 This is not surprising given that the US didn’t want to deal with migration issues at 
all.  President Clinton’s core labour union constituency had much less interest in 
promoting labour mobility than did President Bush I.  Their professed objective was 
to force Mexico to comply with worker standards, given their concern that this lack of 
compliance depressed Mexican wages. 
81 One reason why the NAAEC is a bit stronger than the NAALC is that some 
environmental groups were willing to trade support of the NAFTA package for 
stronger environmental protections.  The unions were not; they effectively told the 
Clinton Administration that they would continue to oppose NAFTA regardless of the 
content of the NAALC. 
82 Some might put it differently, noting that a principal purpose of free trade is to 
promote job growth in member countries so that workers there can find gainful 
employment, and not be forced, as a result, to migrate. 
83 See JoAnne D Spotts “US Immigration Policy on the Southwest Border from 
Reagan Through Clinton 1981-2001” (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal  601. 
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its very beginning, even though implementation has been a “work in progress” 
over the last five decades.84  
According to Elizabeth Kraus, 
 
“The Bush administration, which negotiated the agreement, explained 
that an inclusive position, similar to that in the European Community 
(EC) [now European Union] is not necessary to the agreement as ‘the 
fact of the matter is that what we are negotiating here is a trade 
agreement, not a social contract. We don’t in NAFTA try to parallel 
the kinds of things which the EC, for instance, is engaged in with 
respect to political and social rights and that kind of things.’”85   
 
Experts, especially economists, are not of one mind when it comes to the 
linkages between social issues and free trade.86 The classical tenet is that 
growing trade boosts general welfare by reallocating resources, promoting 
specialization (the “comparative” advantage), and increasing production. That 
is what many experts, politicians, lobbyists and business leaders believed 
NAFTA would do for Mexico. The increased trade between the US and 
Mexico would have such a positive ripple effect on Mexico’s economy that 
jobs would be created, the standard of living would grow rapidly, wealth 
would become widespread and thus immigration of Mexicans to the US 
would slow down to a trickle. Mexicans would remain in Mexico thanks to 
the prosperity brought by NAFTA, and the undocumented immigration 
problem would be solved.87   
However, in a regional trade agreement like NAFTA or the EC, short-
term adjustment challenges invariably arise along with restructuring problems 
and the vicissitudes of local economic variables that cannot always be 
controlled very well.88 Ironically, at times, the opening of the borders to the 
growth of trade between vastly different and unequal economies can unleash 
serious problems and threaten disruptions in the economy, labour patterns, 
                                                     
84 See Kraus, above n 8, at 325. See also Christopher J Cassise “The European Union 
v the United States under the NAFTA: A Comparative Analysis of the Free 
Movement of Persons Within the Regions” (1996) 46 Syracuse Law Review 1343, at 
1372 and Craig L Jackson “Social Policy Harmonization and Worker Rights in the 
European Union: A Model for North America?” (1995) 21 North Carolina Journal of 
Commercial Law and International Regulation 1, at 14-15. 
85 See Kraus, above n 8, at 325. 
86 Jagdeep S Bhandari “Migration and Trade Policies: Symmetry or Paradox?” (2007) 
6 Journal of International Business and Law 17. 
87 See Philip Martin, above n 23, at 365. 
88 See Ann Weston “Social Issues and Labour Adjustment Policies: The Canada-
Unite States FTA Experience” in R Lipsey and P Meller, see above n 24.  
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social life, patterns of consumption and cultural expectations of people, 
especially those in the less affluent and developed party. The widespread 
introduction of new technologies, the rapidly changing patterns of demand, 
the pressures of a quickly changing society oriented more and more on 
conspicuous consumption, and the ever increasing number and strength of 
competitors in the global sphere can challenge and deeply unsettle any given 
society.89 This has caused many, including free trade advocates, to realise that 
growth in trade and commercial integration cannot be isolated from 
considerations of social policy.90  
However, few either in the US or Mexico really want to address social 
policy issues directly. One of the major reasons is that it is expensive. Another 
is that it requires a re-orientation of the mindset towards a more socially 
progressive or mildly “socialist” policy. The political struggle over the 
attempt by President Obama to address the lack of health care for 40 million 
Americans is a good example of these difficulties.  The architects and builders 
of the European Union, which also began life as a free trade area, eventually 
recognized this. One of the mainstays of the EU have been the convergence 
and social cohesion funds that transfer considerable amounts of development 
assistance from wealthier Member States to less affluent ones to ensure their 
rapid growth and smoother transition from developing to relatively developed 
societies. The reasons are both historical and cultural, including but not 
limited to the concept of a social welfare state with a real safety net for the 
less fortunate citizens and nations. This approach has been reduced somewhat 
in the past 15 years because of increasing costs and diminishing revenues, due 
in part to an aging population, drastically reduced birth rates, and substantial 
job losses to cheaper labour areas, especially in Southeast Asia.   
Initially Italy and then Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland have greatly 
benefited from this type of assistance. Now it is the turn of the newly admitted 
Eastern European Member States to receive this help, with the reluctant 
agreement of some of the former beneficiaries, especially Spain.91  The EU is 
likely unique in this respect.  The NAFTA Parties weren’t seeking anything 
like the level of integration that was contemplated for the EU, although 
Mexico likely would have welcomed it because it would be the NAFTA 
Member State benefiting the most from it.  Even the other common markets 
that have tried to pattern themselves after the EU, such as Mercosur and 
ASEAN, have fallen far short with labour mobility as in most other areas. The 
                                                     
89 See ibid. See also Gal-Or, above n 3, at 385. 
90 See ibid, at 192. 
91 There are several types of funds used by the European Union to support the 
development of the “least favoured” regions, interregional cooperation, and making 
regions more competitive: Structural funds, cohesion funds, solidarity funds, ISPA, 
Phare, and Separd.  See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
107 
uniqueness of the EU is that it was indeed eventually able to move towards a 
Single Europe in the late 1980s after a period of stagnation.92 
 
VI. RECONCILING SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL 
FREE TRAD 
 
The awareness that the free movement of workers is ideally an integral 
part of free trade is slowly making some headway.93 It is possible, of course, 
to be concerned about social impacts without necessarily concluding that the 
solution is to encourage or permit migration to the wealthier parties. The EU’s 
experience, however, supports equating recognition of the importance of the 
social impacts of FTAs with favouring a freer movement of people looking 
for work. As Ann Weston stated: 
 
“There is growing consensus…. that for economic integration to be 
socially and politically sustainable, there must be greater attention 
paid to its social impact. This may lead to the conclusion that the 
process of trade liberalisation should be modified (in terms of the 
speed and scope as well as the underlying rules of the game) and/or 
that complementary amendments be made to social policies.”94 
 
One of the major obstacles to this approach is that in the prevailing 
capitalistic, neo-liberal model that governs production, trade and commerce in 
the US, labour is just another commodity and labour markets are supposed to 
behave just like any other market.95 There are signs that President Obama 
would like to change this approach but it is unclear whether he will have any 
success. Thus, it is difficult to sustain a political effort that would recognize 
the free movement of workers as a fundamental right of all those residing in 
NAFTA countries. While it is becoming more recognized that trade and 
                                                     
92 The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome. The Act set for the European Community the objective of establishing a 
Common Market by 31 December 1992, and codified European Political Cooperation, 
the forerunner of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. It came 
into effect on 1 July 1987. The Act's signing grew from the discontent among 
European Community members in the 1980s about the de facto lack of free trade 
among them.  
Eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/111986U/tif/JOL_1987_169_EN_0002.tif 
93 Jagdeep S Bhandari “International Migration and Trade: A Multidisciplinary 
Synthesis” (2006) 6 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 113. 
94 See Ann Weston, above n 90, at 192. 
95 Ian Robinson “The NAFTA Labour Accord in Canada: Experience, Prospects, and 
Alternatives” (1994) 10 Connecticut Journal of International Law 475, at 488. 
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labour mobility are linked,96 there is reluctance to deepen the discourse to 
include, for example, under what conditions there could be labour mobility 
between the US and Mexico, for example or to take into consideration the 
need to agree on labour standards.97 There have been some efforts here but US 
and Canadian labour interests feel that common standards would have a “least 
common denominator” effect, resulting in looser labour standards in the US 
and Canada. 
Three major approaches to this area have been recognized and labelled as 
the NAFTA Clean Approach, the NAFTA Plus Approach and the NAFTA 
Package Approach.98     
Those who advance the NAFTA Clean Approach consider the links 
between labour and trade not that strong or self-evident. Thus, NAFTA should 
not take labour issues into serious consideration.  
The proponents of the NAFTA Plus Approach are at the opposite end of 
the continuum.99 Labour rights and environmental protection supporters want 
NAFTA to recognize the essential importance of the link between trade and 
labour and to include strong and enforceable clauses to address it. This should 
be done also in preparation for a possible deepening of NAFTA. The growth 
of China, India, and Brazil especially may make it not only attractive but 
necessary for their survival for the NAFTA countries to consider moving 
forward with a deeper union, going beyond being only an FTA in order to be 
competitive, face jointly threats originating especially in Asia, and survive. 
The creation and implementation of provisions protecting labour and the 
environment and the creation of a strong mechanism to address labour, 
environment and trade-related problems and disputes are considered 
indispensable for the orderly and successful deepening of NAFTA and for its 
eventual expansion.100   
It must be recognized that there are nuances in all of this. Not all those 
seeking recognition of these links are interested in encouraging immigration. 
They may actually want the opposite, which is the creation of more jobs and 
                                                     
96 Bill Ong Hing “NAFTA, Globalization and Mexican Migrants” (2009) 5 Journal 
of Law Economics and Policy 87. 
97 Bill Ong Hing “Immigration Policy: Thinking Outside the (Big) Box” (2007) 39 
Connecticut Law Review 1401. 
98 See Housman, above n 38, at 306-07. The trans-border issue covers undocumented 
migration, social dumping across the border and labour and environmental standards 
in the maquiladoras, immigration enforcement and related smuggling, trafficking and 
violence, etc. See also Amanda E Schreyer, “Human Smuggling Across the US-
Mexico Border: US Laws Are not Stopping it” (2006) 39 Suffolk University Law 
Review 793. 
99 Ibid, at 319. 
100 Ibid, at 321-22. 
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labour rights in Mexico, to keep additional Mexican immigrants home. The 
theory here is that a labour surplus would depress wage rates in the US.  
However, this is not necessarily so. The opposite can also happen, as the EU’s 
experience demonstrates. The free movement of people in the EU has not 
necessarily or significantly depressed wages in the wealthier EU countries.101 
On the contrary, it has increased wages in the poorer ones to the point that 
some international companies, including American ones, that established 
factories in Eastern Europe, are already moving them out of there because 
labour has become too costly in just a few years.  
The NAFTA Package Approach includes the NAFTA, the NAALC and 
the NAAEC. It is the compromise approach attempting to mesh labour and 
environmental issues with free trade interests.102 It would require new 
Member Countries to adopt the entire package, just as the EU requires new 
Member States to accept the so-called acquis communautaire103 and enforce 
existing laws and regulations accordingly.104 This is in consonance with what 
occurs now with the U S FTAs agreements subsequent to NAFTA. The labour 
and environmental provisions are part of the FTA, not side agreements, and 
are subject to the regular government to government dispute settlement 
mechanisms. 
One could argue that action is needed especially since the NAFTA, while 
addressing the restricted migration of professional directly, leaves out the 
low-skill and low-income sector.105 Yet it is specifically that sector that 
presents the biggest undocumented immigration challenge to the United 
States, while at the same time former President George W. Bush, countless 
politicians and many business leaders have constantly stressed how much the 
                                                     
101 Notwithstanding the well-known “Polish plumber” debate in Germany where 
some people, especially plumbers, argued that day immigrants from nearby lower-
wage countries were forcing down blue collar earnings by unfairly competing with 
local labour by means of charging considerably less for their services. 
102 Ibid, at 323. See also Gal-Or, above n 3, at 387. 
103 The French term acquis communautaire is used in European Union law to refer to 
the total body of EU law accumulated so far. During the process of the enlargement of 
the European Union, the acquis is divided into 31 chapters for the purpose of 
negotiation between the EU and the candidate member states.  
104 For a good comparison of the EU and NAFTA and an assessment of NAFTA in 
comparison with the EU, see M Jeannette Yakamavich “NAFTA on the Move: the 
United States and Mexico on a Journey Toward the Free Movement of Workers: A 
NAFTA Progress Report and EU Comparison” (2002) 8 Law and Business Review 
Annuals 463. For an analysis of Mexican President Fox’s vision of NAFTA becoming 
like the EU, see Jennifer E Harman “Mexican President Vicente Fox’s Proposal to 
Expand NAFTA into a European Union-Style Common Market: Obstacles and 
Outlook” (2001) 7 Law and Business Review Annuals 207. 
105 See Molot, above n 27, at 171. See also Gal-Or, above n 3, at 391. 
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U S economy needs and benefits from low skills workers typically believed to 
do jobs that Americans do not want any more.106 That was the main stated 
rationale that propelled, for example, the 2008 proposals by the George W 
Bush White House to create a guest worker programme.107  
While it may be true that most of those concerned with the weak treatment 
of labour issues under NAFTA are not interested in promoting migration, 
documented and undocumented migration continues unabated and is growing 
within NAFTA and worldwide.108 Moreover, we have come to realise that 
trafficking in human beings is a very large and lucrative business and one of 
the most shameful phenomena that characterise globalisation.109 To continue 
arguing that creating better jobs in Mexico (or other countries) will keep 
would-be immigrants home is simply not working, especially in light of the 
fact that the relatively better jobs that the “maquiladoras” offered Mexicans in 
border towns with the U S have significantly diminished. Quite a few of the 
“maquiladoras”110 built with great hopes of improving the Mexican economy, 
creating large employment and keeping Mexicans in Mexico, are now 
closed,111 the jobs gone to China and other even cheaper countries in South 
                                                     
106 The ambivalent and opportunistic policy and enforcement of the immigration laws 
by the current administration is illustrated by the fact that in 1999, under President 
Bill Clinton, the US government collected $3.69 million in fines from 890 companies 
for employing undocumented workers. In 2004, under President George Bush, the 
federal government collected $188,500 from 64 companies for such illegal 
employment practices. And in 2004, the Bush Administration levied no fines for US 
companies employing undocumented workers. The penalty exacted under the Bush 
White House was quite inconsequential for most medium and large businesses (an 
average of $41,460 under the Clinton administration and $2,945 under the Bush 
administration). http://usliberals.about.com/od/immigration/a/IllegalImmi_2.htm 
107 See Michael J Mayerl “Proposed Guest Worker Statutes: An Unsatisfactory 
Answer to a Difficult, if not Impossible, Question” (2002) 6 Journal of Small and 
Emerging Business 559. 
108 Teresa A Miller “A New Look at Neo-Liberal Economic Policies and the 
Criminalization of Undocumented Migration” (2008)61 SMU Law Review 171. 
109 www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2009. 
110 At one point, there were more than 2,700 maquiladoras in Mexican Border States. 
Presently, it is estimated that there are 2,000 maquilas plants still in business, with 
employment probably around 800,000. Maquiladoras (export-oriented factories) on 
the border account for about 71 percent of all such factories in Mexico. The 
maquiladora industry is the major legal source of Mexico's export earnings. 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=407 
111 It has been reported that more than 500 plants have closed since the beginning of 
the decade, causing a loss of several hundred thousand jobs. China is bolstering its 
status as the world's cheap assembly export location. 
http://geography.about.com/od/urbaneconomicgeography/a/maquiladoras.htm 
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Asia.112 The economic crisis impacting much of the manufacturing world has 
affected Mexico as well. Those reputedly better paying jobs are simply not 
materializing or having a long life and the migration continues unabated.113 
Studying more closely the EU experience and overcoming certain fears and 
prejudices, including plain racism114 as well as economic fears, may be 
needed for the U S to continue to be competitive and survive the onslaught of 
Chinese and other growing countries’ manufactured goods.115 Mexico has also 
been seriously impacted by cheap Chinese imports, for example in the 
footwear, consumer electronics and textile/clothing sectors. Thus there is a 
common interest in deepening the NAFTA in order to effectively counteract 
negative trade developments and survive, learning from and following the 
EU’s experience.  
A growing Mexican immigration into the United States cannot be 
stopped116 even though U S policy makers will continue trying, if not to stop 
                                                     
112 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Beyond the Border: Have Mexico Maquiladoras 
Bottomed Out? Southwest Economy, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2004. 
113 Ranko Shiraki Oliver “In the Twelve Years of NAFTA, the Treaty Gave to Me ... 
What, Exactly?: An Assessment of Economic, Social, and Political Developments in 
Mexico since 1994 and Their Impact on Mexican Immigration into the United States” 
(2007) 10 Harvard Latino Law Review 53.  
114 ESSAY: “Aliens” in Our Midst Post-9/11: Legislating Outsiderness within the 
Borders, Defining America Through Immigration Policy (Mapping Racisms 
Series). The “Huddled Masses” Myth: Immigration and Civil Rights. By Kevin R 
Johnson, Reviewed by Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R Lazos Vargas. 
115 It depends naturally on who one is talking to. One could argue that US 
competitiveness with China would be most enhanced if Mexican production by US 
firms were increased so that only parts and components are made in the US The 
argument is that there is no effective means of dealing with high US wages in some 
industries. 
116 The total number of Mexicans in the US, according to the Pew Hispanic Center 
mid-decade estimate, is almost 27 million. Mexicans constitute 64% of all Hispanics 
in the United States and 30.7% of all foreign born in the United States, by far the 
largest Hispanic group and 9% of the overall United States population, the third 
largest ethnic group after Whites and Blacks (all Hispanics are the second largest 
group at 14.5%). The United States issued 906,622 non-immigrant visas for Mexicans 
in fiscal year (FY) 2005. In addition, 732,566 laser visas (which replaced the old 
border crossing cards for those who live on the Mexican side of the border but work 
in the United States) were issued in FY 2005. As of March 2006, the estimated 
unauthorized population in the United States was 11.5 to 12 million, of which 4.5 to 6 
million entered legally with inspection and 6 to 7 million entered illegally without 
inspection. An estimated 6.2 million (or 56 percent) of all unauthorized migrants are 
from Mexico. (Sources: Pew Hispanic Center Estimates based on March 2005 Current 
Population Survey; DHS reports;  
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=407). 
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE FLOW OF TRADE VERSUS THE FLOW OF 
PEOPLE IN NAFTA 
 
112 
it, at least to slow it down. A critical mass of the Mexican-American 
population has been reached.117 Ties between Mexicans and their family 
members in the United States, the geographical land connection between the 
US and Mexico which facilitates traveling back and forth between the two 
countries and maintains strong affective, language and cultural ties with the 
place of origin, and the relative ease of travel in today’s high mobility 
world118 make possible, support and spur the constant flow of migrants to the 
US and make the need to integrate into the host society less urgent and 
necessary.119 Promoting economic development in Mexico, thus providing 
economic incentives for Mexicans not to leave, has been proposed as an 
outcome of NAFTA and as the justification to ignore migration issues.120 
However, the US has never made a real, serious effort to foster such 
development like the European Investment Bank121 in Luxembourg or the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development122 in London have done, 
                                                     
117 Marc Belanger “Immigration, Race, and Economic Globalization on the US-
Mexico Border: Tangled Histories and Contemporary Realities” (2006) 10 Journal of 
Gender Race and Justice 1.  
118 Even though it has become more difficult to cross the border successfully into the 
US, with obstacles like the fence built by the US, military air patrols, death in the 
desert, unscrupulous coyotes, the high cost of paying coyotes as a guide into the 
United States, etc. 
119 It is estimated that there are between 8 and 10 million undocumented workers in 
the US. For a discussion of employer sanctions as a way to discourage undocumented 
immigration, see Jeffrey L Ehrenpreis “Controlling Our Borders Through Enhanced 
Employer Sanctions” (2006) 79 Southern California Law Review 1203. See also 
Daniel A Scharf  “For Humane Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal Activity 
in the Sonoran Desert” (2006) 38 Case Western Journal of International Law 141. 
120 Carvana Hicks “The NAFTA Aftermath: Analyzing a Free Trade Agreement 
Defectively Designed to Perpetuate Poverty and Dependency in Rural Mexico” 
(2004) 13 Currents International Trade Law Journal 49, at 51.   
121 The European Investment Bank (Banque Européenne d'Investissement) is the 
European Union's long-term lending institution established in 1958 under the Treaty 
of Rome. A policy-driven bank, the EIB supports the EU’s priority objectives, 
especially European integration and the development of economically weak regions. 
Recently, the Bank has also been actively supporting European R&D projects as part 
of EU's objective of building the world's leading knowledge-based economy. 
122 Founded in 1991, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) uses investment to help build market economies and democracies in 30 
countries from central Europe to central Asia. Its mission initially was to support 
Europe’s formerly communist countries in the process of establishing their own free 
market economies. For this reason, despite its public sector shareholders, it invests 
mainly in private enterprises, usually together with commercial partners. EBRD 
provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses, both new ventures and 
investments in existing companies. It also works with publicly owned companies to 
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especially for Southern and Eastern Europe. Moreover, as already stated, 
Mexico has suffered considerable economic contraction because of the direct 
competition of Chinese imports, which are cheaper than locally produced 
goods. Thus, the migratory pressure will continue and increase.123   
A truly different and forward-looking alternative would be to permit freer 
legal migration, recognizing and accepting that social and economic forces 
will continue to provide a strong impetus for migration between Mexico and 
the US124 The issue is, of course, job creation. Traditionally the US 
government has not been willing to devote sufficient resources to this end. 
However, the dramatic and profound economic crisis of 2009 has forced a 
change in the role that government plays in the US labour market. There is 
tremendous pressure on the Obama administration to address the 
unemployment crisis, officially at just below 10% nationwide at the end of 
2009 but in reality around 18% or more. The massive governmental 
intervention to save and stabilize the economy, especially the stock market, 
banks, insurance and automotive sectors, has altered the relation between the 
U S government and the U S economy, industry and people. The health care 
reform, especially if a public option is successfully included, is also a 
powerful and undeniable indication of the major role that the government is 
taking in the ordinary lives of Americans. While the U S is not becoming any 
time soon a “State Providence” that provides for its citizens from the cradle to 
the grave as in Europe, particularly in Scandinavian countries, one can argue 
with considerable strength that the classic and mythical “self help” model of 
Americans, solving their own problems without the government’s 
intervention, is pretty mythical, at best a relic of an XVIII century farming 
and ranching society where circumstances and lifestyle made self-help often 
the only available solution to life’s problems.  
The EU opening of the frontiers of the more affluent countries to the free 
circulation of “poorer cousins” first from the South (Italy, Greece), then the 
Southwest (Spain, Portugal), and most recently the East (Poland and other 
former Eastern Soviet block countries) of Europe can serve as a model,125 if 
                                                                                                                              
support privatisation, restructuring state-owned firms and improvement of municipal 
services. The EBRD’s mandate stipulates that it must only work in countries that are 
committed to democratic principles. 
123 “Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to 
Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated” (PDF). Government Accountability 
Office, August 2006, p 42. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf. 
124 Philip I Martin “Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA” 
(1999) 3 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 419, at 423.   
125 See Christopher Cassise “The European Union v the United States Under the 
NAFTA: A Comparative Analysis of the Free Movement of Persons Within the 
Region” (1996) 46 Syracuse Law Review 1343. 
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and when the US is prepared to foster a “wider and deeper” NAFTA, which 
does not seem very likely in the short or medium term. However, the world 
has changed dramatically just in the last year as the bowing of President 
Obama to Japan’s Emperor, a gesture widely criticized, his praiseful and 
subdued statements about China vis-à-vis the U S and the decline of the dollar 
clearly (and painfully) indicate.126 While it is easier to move U S factories to 
Mexico, China, or Vietnam, given the zero or low tariffs on most imported 
goods other than textiles and clothing, there is a long term high price to be 
paid for the gradual but inevitable loss of technical know-how and 
manufacturing innovation and for the loss of employment that affects not only 
individuals and their families but their entire communities as well. An 
amendment to NAFTA dealing with the integration of the regional movement 
of labour, including Americans working in Mexico, would be 
groundbreaking.127 While President Obama was focused, when advocating 
NAFTA amendments in his campaign in 2008, on improving the enforcement 
of the labour and environmental obligations vis-a-vis Mexico, and never 
suggested amendments relating to migration, events in the world, and 
especially the US economy, may force his and Congress’s hand on this.  To 
his credit, the administration has announced a new effort to convince 
Congress to enact immigration reform in a manner that would deal reasonably 
with the 12 million undocumented aliens now in the US. One does not need to 
be overly pessimistic to know that such measure would be nothing more than 
a band-aid, a stopgap in a continuing migratory march towards richer 
countries worldwide.  
The best solution would be to move NAFTA beyond being merely a free 
trade area and eventually, long term, progress through various steps to 
become more and more like the EU. For instance, NAFTA should move from 
being simply a FTA to becoming a customs union, then to having a joint 
economic and monetary policy, then to further legal and economic 
harmonization, the formulation of a common security and immigration policy, 
and finally reaching political integration and adopting a common foreign 
policy.128 This would require that all three NAFTA members, but especially 
Mexico, make a broad variety of legal, economic, tax and policy changes. 
                                                     
126 See Kevin R Johnson “Regional Integration in North America and Europe: 
Lessons About Civil Rights and Equal Citizenship” (2001) 9 University of Miami 
International and Comparative Law Review 33 (2001). 
127 Elizabeth L Gunn “Regionalizing Labour Policy through NAFTA: Beyond 
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Mexico was already forced to make some changes with NAFTA but not in 
terms of rule of law, tax and energy policies, etc. Obviously, the US economy, 
even in boom times,129 could not possibly absorb the 40-50 million Mexicans 
(and additional Central Americans traveling to the US through Mexico) that 
some estimate would move or attempt to move to the U S, if given the chance. 
Thus, adopting the four EU’s freedoms as the basic law of NAFTA: freedom 
of movement of capital, goods, services and people130 would require a 
considerable evolution of NAFTA over a number of years.  A factor working 
in favor of a deeper union is the eventual slowing down in Mexico’s 
population growth, reducing the labour pool ready to emigrate. 
Whether the politicians and the voters in the US will acknowledge and 
accept that a Mexican presence in this country is inevitable and unstoppable is 
not all certain at this point, especially in the post 9/11 and current economic 
crisis environment.131  However, Americans may have to come to accept that 
fundamental equations of power have been and are changing in the world and 
that the days of the U S unfettered, unchallenged and single-handed pre-
eminence and dominance in the world, especially in the world’s economy, are 
counted.  The EU adopted the four freedoms and implemented them over a 
50-year time period, at times with tremendous resistance, because of the 
realization that not doing so would mark the end of Europe’s way of life and 
wealth. It is argued here that there are strong enough indicators to support an 
eventual expansion of NAFTA to include the free movement of people 
(workers) as a long-term objective and as part of a deeper and broader 
regional integration, which also presupposes substantial reforms, especially in 
Mexico. Not doing so will be at the future’s peril of the US. 
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